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Abstract
How large are the welfare gains from trade? Would such gains be significantly
amplified in the long run when productivity is endogenously enhanced? To address
these questions, we focus on the dynamic effect of trade, in particular, how trade af-
fects the incentives for technological advancement. We construct an innovation-based
endogenous growth model of North-South trade. There are two types of innovation:
one by the North to upgrade the general purpose technology (GPT) and another by all
countries to advance entrepreneurial knowledge for developing differentiated prod-
ucts. We find sizable welfare gains from trade, about 5.3% when compared to autarky.
The gains in our dynamic model are much higher than the static estimates where the
effets of GPT-driven innovation are eliminated. The share of dynamic gains from trade
is about 78% of the total gains in our benchmark economy – much higher than com-
parable figures identified in previous studies. Comparative statics indicate that GPT
innovation efficacy, entrepreneurial talent distribution and trade elasticity are crucial
for dynamic gains from trade.
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The essence of technological modernity is non-stationarity: ... as far as
future technological progress and economic growth are concerned, not even
the sky is the limit. ... Inside the black box of technology is a smaller black box
called “research and development” which translates inputs into the output of
knowledge. This black box itself contains an even smaller black box which
models the available knowledge in society ... . (Mokyr 2005; p. 32, p. 42, p. 62)
1 Introduction
How large are the welfare gains from trade? This has been one of the central questions in
economics dating back to Adam Smith. The influential study by Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodriguez-Clare (2012; henceforth ACR) and related literature have shown that the gains
from trade in a static framework are typically small, typically below 2% even compared
to autarky. In the empirical development literature, however, trade liberalization has
been perceived to lead to higher productivity and faster growth.1,2 This suggests that
gains from trade would be amplified in a dynamic framework in which productivity is
endogenously advanced as emphasized in development studies.
To address this important issue, we determine (i) what are the driving forces for produc-
tivity enhancement and growth and (ii) how does trade play a role in this dynamic process. Re-
garding the first issue, we generalize the endogenous growth framework a là Aghion and
Howitt (1992; henceforth AH) in which the sustained growth of the economy is driven
by R&D with creative destruction. In light of the historical evolution of technology (cf.
Mokyr 1992 and his handbook article 2005), we consider two types of innovation. One
is a general purpose technology (GPT) that evolves in a similar way to that in AH. We
think of GPT as a technology that is pervasive, potentially beneficial to all products and
1In most cross-country studies, there is a positive relationship between trade openness and economic
growth (e.g., Frenkle and Romer 1999 find that the effect of trade on income growth is large though the
standard errors are also large in IV estimation leading to only marginal statistical significance). In the
decade after liberalization, economic growth has been significantly higher than in the previous decade.
For example, using Sachs and Warner liberalization index in panel regressions, Greenaway, Morgan, and
Wright (2002) find a growth effect of major trade reforms amounted to just under 1% in year 1 after the
reform, 1.5% in year 2, and 2% in subsequent years.
2Productivity gains from trade liberalization have been identified in varous empirical studies, such as
in Brazil (Ferreira and Rossi 2003), Chile (Pavcnik 2002), Colombia (Fernandes 2007), India (Topalova and
Khandelwal 2011), Indonesia (Amiti and Konings 2007), Korea (Kim 2000), and even in developed coun-
tries such as the U.S. (such productivity gain amounts to 1.2% in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel 2009). More
recently, Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2015) find large productivity gains from tariff reduction in Hungary
where imported inputs contribute to about a quarter of its productivity growth. Bloom, Draca, and van
Reenen (2016) and Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2017) also identify large productivity gains
from Chinese firms since China’s accession to the WTO.
having potential for continuous technical advancement (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995,
Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998). Historical examples of GPT include internal combustion
engines, electricity, digital data processing, macromolecules composition and semicon-
ductors. Another type of innovation is on differentiated products which are tradeable
and use GPT. Similar to Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003; henceforth BEJK), each
entrepreneur in our economy enters a market of a specific product to compete globally
in a Bertrand fashion. All differentiated products require the use of the GPT to produce
hence, whenever GPT advances, the ideas (or blueprints) of the set of differentiated prod-
ucts need to be redrawn. Better GPT allows more ideas to be drawn. In our North-South
trade framework, GPT innovation is only conducted in the North but used by both the
North and the South.3
Next we address how international trade affects R&D incentives and growth. Our
model uses the BEJK framework as a starting point which we supplement with GPT
innovation. Since only the North firm does GPT innovation, we assume that the rents
earned by BEJK differentiated-product firms are shared with the GPT firm according to
Nash bargaining. The static gains from lowering trade barriers over time can will affect
the incentive for GPT innovation. Thus, with trade we observe interaction between the
forces affecting GPT innovation and the general equilibrium effects in the BEJK trade en-
vironment. We identify three channels through which trade liberalization affects welfare:
(i) a typical static channel comparable to the ACR setting, (ii) an income-gains channel
for the North because its GPT firm receives payments from the South, and (iii) a growth
channel via incentivizing the GPT innovation.
As will be shown in Section 3.2, the link between GPT innovation and trade costs
can be captured by a multiplier. Trade liberalization induces this multiplier to increase,
hence incentivizing GPT innovation and increasing the economic growth rate. The intu-
ition is that aggregate world revenue and hence aggregate labor demand (in North labor
units) increase in face of trade liberalization because a more integrated economy implies
a stronger demand for the South’s labor (relative to the North’s) which reduces the wage
gap (essentially a factor-price-equalization effect of trade). When R&D effort increases
as a result, the growth rate g becomes higher. Namely, trade amplifies the spiral effect of
growth. This mechanism of trade and growth, with globalization characterized by falling
tariffs and improving transport technology contributing to the narrowing of income and
wage gaps between the North and many developing countries is consistent with recent
3Innovation on the GPT is generally more difficult than other innovations and empirical studies have
shown that the spatial distribution of innovation (let alone the GPT innovation) is highly uneven, with the
North countries having a dominant share (e.g., see Egger and Loumeau 2018).
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research (see, e.g., Caliendo et al. 2017).
The central focus of our analysis is on the total gains from trade and the contribution
of dynamics (the dynamic share.) In our model, the long-run welfare change in response
to a change in trade cost can be written as a product of a growth-rate effect (GR), an
income-gains effect (IG), and the ACR statistic. The GR effect is a direct dynamic effect
of a trade shock, as it reflects how growth amplifies the gains from trade. The IG comes
from payments the North receives from the differentiated-product firms worldwide for
using the GPT. ACR gains come from the usual static sources.
We investigate two scenarios: (i) the first studies trade liberalization from autarky to
the benchmark trade cost, and (ii) the second examines the trade liberalization from the
benchmark trade cost to frictionless or free trade. In scenario (i), the total gains from
trade are 5:34%; the GR, IG, and ACR shares of total gains are 79:6%, 12:0%, and 8:4%,
respectively. Here, one can see that the growth-rate effect is by far the strongest among
the three. In scenario (ii), the total gains from trade is 3:18%; and the shares of the GR, IG,
and ACR components in the total gains are 49:7%, 8:4%, and 41:9%, respectively. In this
case, both the GR and ACR components are important.
However, the simple decomposition does not yield true dynamic gains due to the
presence of general equilibrium effects. To isolate the dynamic gains, we compare the
benchmark model with a purely static model by removing the endogenous growth mech-
anism. We find that in scenario (i), the static gains are 1:15%, and the total gains are 4:7
times larger than the static gains, implying a dynamic share of 78:1%. In scenario (ii), the
static gains are 1:62, and the total gains are 1:97 times larger, yielding a dynamic share
of 48:7%. The dynamic shares, especially that in scenario (i), are substantially larger than
the figures found in related recent literature on dynamic gains from trade; see further
discussions below.
It turns out that the GR share approximates the true dynamic share quite well, and
this implies that the general equilibrium effects of shutting down the dynamic mecha-
nism are quite small. Thus, the economics underlying the difference between the two
scenarios can be understood via the simple decomposition. First, by the envelope theo-
rem (or Shepherd’s Lemma), the ACR statistic reflects essentially a direct effect of trade
cost on prices of the imported goods. Under lower trade costs, consumed quantities of
imported goods tend to be larger, and this amplifies the direct price effect. This explains
why the ACR effect is much larger in scenario (ii) than (i). Second, with a large trade cost,
the wage gap between two countries is quite large, and reducing trade costs from autarky
to the benchmark level reduces this wage gap drastically. This results in a sharp increase
in the relative demand for the South’s labor, and, with more equal wages, a larger global
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market.(a larger multiplier for GPT innovation). The increase in GPT R&D is therefore
larger in scenario (i), yielding a larger GR effect.
We also find that trade liberalization substantially reduces the North-South welfare
gap, which is almost halved when moving from autarky to a frictionless world. We also
conduct sensitivity analyses which show that our main results are robust: while total
gains from trade associated with GPT-driven innovations are substantial, the dynamic
share when comparing with autarky are overall much larger compared with related recent
literature.
To summarize and put in the language of the quote from Mokyr (2005), we open the
black box of technology with endogenous GPT advancement by innovators and product
ideas drawn by entrepreneurs. We then open the smaller black box of R&D by allowing
heterogeneous labor and sorting into researchers and entrepreneurs. Finally, we open the
even smaller black box of the available knowledge in society by the productivity-ladder
effect of GPT innovation on the technology stocks of the differentiated products. In this
setup, trade is an amplifier of the spiral effect that leads to endogenous growth: aggregate
global sales go up in face of trade liberalization and hence the value of innovation rises,
thereby inducing more R&D and faster growth, which in turns promotes further growth
of aggregate global sales.
Related Literature
Our study is closely related with a series of recent studies on dynamic welfare gains
from trade. Sampson (2016) develops an endogenous growth model in which the produc-
tivity distribution of firms constantly moves to the right over time as entrants learn from
the incumbent firms that survived selection previously.4 Perla, Tonetti and Waugh (2015)
quantifies a model of trade and growth in which all firms (entrants and incumbents) learn
from each other (not just the entrants learning from the incumbents as in Sampson 2016).
Impullitti and Licandro (2017) construct a two-country model with process innovation.
Hsieh, Klenow and Nath (2019) construct a North-North trade model allowing global
competition in innovation and growth exclusively from global creative destruction. Our
model mechanism differs from all of the above studies. Whereas the total gains from trade
compared with autarky in our benchmark economy, 5:34%, is near the lower end (higher
than 3:6% found by Sampson 2016 at but lower than the other three above-mentioned
studies), the dynamic share in the scenario comparing with autarky, 78%, is around the
higher end, higher than all of the above-mentioned studies except Perla et al. (2015), who
4The growth mechanism in our model is different from Sampson’s, and the productivity distribution in
our model also moves to the right over time as the scaling factors in the Fréchet distribution grow endoge-
nously over time.
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found a dynamic share of 85%.
Also related are the following four studies on dynamic gains from trade which focuses
on different counter-factual exercises from ours, and hence the welfare figures are not di-
rectly comparable. Alessandria, Choi and Ruhl (2014) evaluate welfare gains from tariff
reductions in a model of exporting firms’ life cycle which features a tradeoff between
new firm creation and export capacity expansion. Bloom, Romer, Terry, and Van Reenen
(2016) examine gains from trade in the presence of frictions that impede factor mobility,
which spurs innovation and increases economic growth rate in the medium run, resulting
in larger welfare gains from trade. Buera and Oberfield (2019) quantifies a multi-country
model of trade with global diffusion of ideas in a BEJK-type model. Similar to our model,
country-specific distributions of the frontier knowledge are described by Fréchet and en-
dogenously evolve over time. Ravikumar, Santacreu, and Sposi (2018) investigate a trade
model with capital accumulation and fit the model to a sample of 44 countries.5
Within the static framework, Atkeson and Burstein (2010) show that the welfare gains
from trade are typically small and similar to models with homogenous firms because
the positive effects on aggregate productivity by firm entry/exit are offset by product
innovation.6 Also related is the study by Grossman and Helpman (2018) who probes the
effect of trade and growth on income inequality.
2 The Model
There are two countries, i = 1; 2, each with population Ni, which is constant over time.
Without loss of generality, we shall label country 1 and 2 as the North and South, re-
spectively. Time is continuous, with calendar time indexed by t and innovation time by
.
5See also the earlier work by Baldwin (1992) who showed that the gains in output in the steady state
from a trade liberalization in a model with capital accumulation can be several times larger than the static
gains.
6Since ACR and Atkeson and Burstein, the literature on the welfare gains from trade is fast-growing and
already large. This includes the discussion on the role of pro-competitive effects such as Arkolakis et al.
(2018), Edmond et al. (2015), Feenstra et al. (2016) and Holmes et al. (2014), the role of estimation of trade
elasticity such as Simonovska and Waugh (2014a, b), the role of productivity distribution such as Melitz
and Redding (2015), and the role of intermediate goods and sectoral linkages such as Caliendo and Parro
(2015). Also, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) discuss the differential effects of trade liberalization on
consumers with different income. di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang (2014) and Hsieh and Ossa (2016)
investigate the global welfare impact of China’s trade integration and productivity growth.
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2.1 Preference
The life time utility of each individual in country i is:
Ui =
Z 1
0
Qite
 tdt;
where  is the time preference rate, and instantaneous utility Qit is given by the standard
CES aggregator:
Qit =
Z 1
0
(qit(!))
 1
 d!
 
 1
;
where  is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods which are indexed by
!.
2.2 Innovation
GPT R&D and the subsequent innovation only occur in the North. Each good ! requires a
blueprint of the production process and production workers to implement such a process
to produce. Each production process requires use of GPT, which is embodied in a “chip”
(or an operation system, or engine, etc). Here, a new generation of GPT has two effects.
First, the production process of every good has to be revamped to accommodate this
new chip, and hence new ideas about how to produce have to be drawn again. Second,
because chips become better over time and allow more flexibility in how to produce the
final good !, the number of ideas that entrepreneurs can draw grows by a constant factor
 > 1, which resembles the size of quality ladder as in AH and Anant, Dinopoulos, and
Segerstrom (1990). The GPT monopoly can make each chip good-specific at zero cost.
In the North, there is a unit continuum of GPT innovating firms, each of which engages
in hiring R&D labor (researchers) and innovation occurs in a Poisson arrival fashion. So,
this market is perfectly competitive, and innovating firms take the wages for R&D labor as
given. As these firms are ex ante identical and the GPT arrival rate for an individual firm
is the GPT arrival for the whole continuum. Once the GPT innovation occurs, without
loss of generality, one firm is randomly selected as the new GPT monopoly.7 We will
formally describe the GPT innovation process in Section 2.4.
Let ti0 denote the number of ideas per unit of the Mi0 entrepreneurial labor at time
zero. When -th generation of GPT is invented, at time + each unit of the Mi entre-
7The model can be straightforwardly modified to the Aghion-Howitt setting withR fixed and ' function
being constant returns to scale so that there are numerous R&D firms to compete for the lone monopolist in
the future.
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preneurial labor for each good ! works in that instant to come up ti0 ideas, and the
productivity of each idea is drawn from a Fréchet distribution, F drawi (z) = e z
  . Firms
engage in Bertrand competition as in BEJK, and the best idea prevails. Then, at ++ the
GPT monopoly makes the chip !-specific to each ! and engages in a Nash bargaining
with each entrepreneur who owns the best production process to produce !. For each !,
the bargaining is one-time over the expected profits earned by the !-firm for the entire
duration of the GPT (until it is replaced by the next GPT innovation), and the bargaining
power of the GPT firm is  2 (0; 1). For simplicity, marginal cost of producing each addi-
tional chip is assumed to be zero. In expected terms, this bargaining outcome can also be
interpreted as the GPT monopoly selling the right at every instant to use !-chip for each
! at the price of  times the profit of the !-firm, and this is indeed a royalty payment.
Entrepreneurs in both countries need to purchase the !-chip from GPT innovators.
The evolution of the total number of idea draws in each country i is:
Ti = Mi
vti0:
Both evolution of Mi and GPT innovations matter for the aggregate Ti ; cross-country
difference in Ti is also affected by ti0. Due to historical reasons, assume that the North
has a larger initial knowledge stock so that t10 > t20. As there are Ti draws of ideas for
each good from F drawi (z), the c.d.f. of the maximum productivity of these draws and that
of the top two productivities are given by,8
Fi; (z) = e
 Ti;z  ; z  0, (1)
Fi;(z1; z2) = [1 + Ti;(z
 
2   z 1 )]e Ti;z
 
2 : (2)
The BEJK trade model starts with (1) and (2) with given Ti; .9 We now turn to the trade
environment in BEJK.
2.3 Production and Trade
We briefly explain how the cost and price distributions are determined in BEJK and then
collect several useful results from BEJK. For each good !, the unit cost of supplying to
8Note that whereas GPT innovation enhances productivities of all goods, it is not a typical sense of
process innovation, which is often considered as a firm-level effort.
9Even under the assumption of the Fréchet draws, the joint distribution in (2) is a limit result when the
number of draws tends to infinity. Thus, Ti ’s need to be large numbers so that (2) can be applied. For this
purpose, we assume ti0’s to be large numbers.
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consumers in location n by the k-th most efficient producers located in i is given by,
Ckni(!) =

wi
Zki(!)

ni;
where ni = 1 if n = i; ni =  if n 6= i; and the Z1i(!) and Z2i(!) are random vari-
ables whose joint distribution is given by (2). The producer serving market n has unit
cost C1n(!) = minifC1ni(!)g, and the second lowest cost to supply to n is C2n(!) =
minfC2in(!);mini 6=ifC1in(!)gg; where i is the country in which the lowest cost sup-
plier to n is located. Bertrand competition implies that the producer with C1n(!) charges
C2n(!), resulting in a markup of C2n(!)=C1n(!). Under the CES specification of the utility
function, this markup cannot exceed the monopoly markup =(   1) if  > 1. Bertrand
limit pricing yields:
Pn(!) =
(
minfC2n(!);  1C1n(!)g if  > 1
C2n(!) if   1
:
Using (1) and (2), the joint distribution function of C1n and C2n is Hn(c1; c2) = 1  e nc1  
nc

1e
 nc2 , where n =
P2
i=1 Ti(wini)
 , which distills the parameters of productivity
distributions, wages, and the trade cost into one single term governing the cost and price
distributions. The following properties either recap or extend the BEJK’s analytical results
that are useful for our analysis.
BEJK Result 1 The probability that country i provides a good at the lowest cost in coun-
try n is:
ni =
Ti(wini)
 P2
k=1 Tk(wknk)
  =
Ti(wini)
 
n
:
Since there is a continuum of goods, ni is also the fraction of goods that the con-
sumers at n purchases from i.
BEJK Result 2 In a country n, the probability of buying a good with price lower than p is
independent from where the good is purchased from. Thus, ni is also the share of
expenditure of consumers in n on the goods from i:
Xni = niYn;
where Xni is the total sales from country i to n, and Yn denote the total (nominal)
income in n. Let Xn denote the total sales of producers in n, and note that the above
equation differs from the formula in BEJK, Xni = niXn, because in our model total
8
revenue from firms producing differentiated products is not equal to total income
due to the international royalty payments.
BEJK Result 3 Under  + 1 > , the price index in country n is:
Pn = 
  1

n ;
where  
nh
1 + ( 1
1+ 
 

 1
 i
 
 
+1 

o 11 
with   denoting the gamma func-
tion.
BEJK Result 4 A fraction =(1 + ) of revenue goes to variable cost.
2.4 Labor Markets
We consider two types of labor in the North, entrepreneurial type and research type, both
following a common skill distribution. By occupational choice, the entrepreneurial type
endogenously sort into entrepreneurs and production workers whereas the research type
as R&D labor and production workers. The South is populated with labor of the entrepre-
neurial type only. This can be justified by viewing that there is no suitable environment
for GPT innovation in the South, and hence all individuals can only choose between be-
ing an entrepreneur or a production worker; natively-born research type in the South
can only migrate to the North to engage in GPT innovation. The labor markets in both
countries are perfectly competitive.
In the North, the shares of the two types of labor are exogenously given, with  being
the entrepreneurial type and 1   the research type; the population of the two types are
denoted as NM1 =  N1 and NR1 = (1   )N1, respectively. Each individual in each type
has an entrepreneurial/research skill a, and the common distribution of a is denoted as
G. Skill-augmented workforce is thus measured in skill units, or equivalently, labor effi-
ciency units. Being a production worker is always an option for each individual, whose
wages wi are independent of individual skill. Assume that a follows the Pareto distribu-
tion, G (a) = 1  a k , with k > 1 and the minimum skill normalized to one.
By BEJK Result 4 and the fact that part of the profit is paid to the GPT firm, the ex-
pected payoff for one with skill a to become an entrepreneur is a  vi = a1 1+ XiMiv . An
individual of the entrepreneurial type in country i at innovation time  choose to become
an entrepreneur if and only if avi  wi . Note that by definition,Miv = NMi
R1
aMi
adG (a),
where aMi is the cutoff of occupational choice. With the Pareto G, it is readily verified that
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the entrepreneurial activity Mi is given by,
Miv =

kNMi
k   1
 1
k

1  
1 + 
Xi
wi
 k 1
k
. (3)
When sales-wage ratio Xi=wi increases, entrepreneurship also increases; this is a prop-
erty that is absent in the BEJK model.
We now shift our attention to the research type, whose occupational choice depends
critically on the value of innovation. As the aggregate profit earned by all differentiated-
product firms is X1+X2
1+
at any point in time between -th and  + 1-th innovations, the
value of an innovation is, in a similar fashion to AH, specified by
V+1 = 
Z 1
0
Z t
0
(X1+1 +X2+1) e
 r
1 + 
d

 (R+1) e
 (R+1)tdt
=
 (X1+1 +X2+1)
(1 + ) [r +  (R+1)]
: (4)
where r is the real interest rate, and the Poisson arrival rate  is an increasing function of
R&D laborR hired for innovating a new GPT. Here, the value of innovation is the sum of
the GPT profits over time properly discounted by both the real interest rate and the rate
of creative destruction,  (R+1). Taking V+1 and the wages for researchers in the North
wR as given,10 a GPT innovator solves:
max
R
 (R)V+1   wR R .
Whenever an innovation arrives, the innovator becomes the GPT monopoly. With (4), the
first-order condition is:
MB  0 (R)V+1 =  (X1+1 +X2+1)
1 + 
0 (R)
r +  (R+1)
= wR MC; (5)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of R and the right-hand side is the mar-
ginal cost. We restrict 00 < 0 so that the second-order condition 00 (R)V+1 < 0 holds.
A research-type individual with skill a at innovation time  chooses to be a researcher
if and only if a  wR  w1 . By definition, R = NR1
R1
aR
adG (a), where aR is the cutoff of
occupational choice. With aR solved out in R under the Pareto G, the equality aR wR =
10As there is a continuum of GPT innovators, each innovator is an atomless agent, who takes both the
expected GPT monopoly revenue  (X1+1 +X2+1) =(1 + ) and the expected rate of creative destruction
of his own prey  (R+1) as given.
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w1 can be rewritten as:
wR
w1
=

k   1
k
R
NR1
 1
k 1
. (6)
This captures the occupational-choice effect – the higher the wages for a researcher rela-
tive to those for a production worker, the larger the proportion of individuals choosing to
be researchers.
Using (6) and rewriting the marginal cost and benefit in unit of the North’s labor, (5)
becomes:
 (X1+1 +X2+1)
(1 + )w1
0 (R)
r +  (R+1)
=

k   1
k
R
NR1
 1
k 1
. (7)
The left-hand side of (7) contains two components – the AH component 
0(R)
r+(R+1)
that
captures the effect of arrival, interest, and create-destruction rates on the marginal benefit,
and a multiplier (X1+1+X2+1)
(1+)w1
due to royalty revenue that is proportional to the world
economy’s aggregate revenue, in unit of the North’s labor. Clearly, a higher multiplier
incentivizes R&D, and this multiplier term, which we call R&D multiplier, is the key to
link trade and growth as we will explain in Section 3.2. The right-hand side of (7) implies
an increasing marginal cost of GPT R&D due to the occupational-choice effect.
The labor market clearing condition for production workers (Li) requires that labor
demand be equal to labor supply determined by the occupational choices. Utilizing the
BEJK Result 4, 
1+
X1 = w1L1, we have 1+
X1
w1
= NM1 G
 
aM1

+ NR1 G
 
aR

and 
1+
X2
w2
=
N2G
 
aM1

, which can be combined with the definitions of Miv and R to yield two useful
equilibrium conditions for production workers:

1 + 
X1
w1
= NM1
"
1 

k
k   1
NM1
M1v
  k
k 1
#
+NR1
"
1 

k
k   1
NR1
Rv
  k
k 1
#
; (8)

1 + 
X2
w2
= N2
"
1 

k
k   1
N2
M2v
  k
k 1
#
: (9)
2.5 Goods Markets
The goods markets differ from those in the BEJK model because of royalty payments
amounted to 
1+
X2 from the South to the North. That is, the national incomes in the
North and the South are, respectively, Y1 = X1 + 1+X2 and Y2 = X2   1+X2 . These
together imply that X12; = X21; + 1+X2 . Denote the wage gap between the North and
South by w  w1=w2 , the gap in the initial knowledge stock for differentiated products
by t0  t10t20 , and the gap in entrepreneurial activities by m  M1=M2 . In Appendix A,
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we derive the following equilibrium condition linking relative output scales to the wage
and the entrepreneurial activity ratios, w and m :
X1
X2
= mw
 

"
mt0w
 
v + 
 
mt0 (wv)
  + 1
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 
#
. (10)
Because GPT innovation is the sole driver of economic growth, total revenues and wages
evolve according to
Xi;+1
Xi;
=
Yi;+1
Yi
=
wi;+1
wi;
=
wR+1
wR
= 1 + g (R) = 1 +  (R) ln () : (11)
The evolution of these key variables all depends commonly on R&D devoted to GPT. This
ensures a well-defined concept of steady-state growth at a common rate, to which we now
turn.
3 Balanced Growth Path
A dynamic world equilibrium (DWE) is a sequence of a tuple fX1 ; X2 ;M1 ;M2 ; R ; w1 ; w2g
that satisfies, at any innovation time  and for a given initial value of w10, three occupa-
tional choice conditions with two in the North and one in the South summarized by (3)
and (7) (where the last encompasses the first-order condition of GPT innovators), two la-
bor market clearing conditions (8) and (9), the trade condition (10) and a law of motion or
growth condition (11).
A balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium is a DWE with a constant, common growth
rate g. As seen from (11), along a BGP, wages, total revenues and total income all grow at
the common rate g(R), whereas all labor variables are constant.
3.1 Characterization of the BGP
The common growth property of BGP enables us to characterize all growing variables in
“great ratios.”
To do so, we further define x  X1=X2 and   N1=N2. From (3) and (10), we can
express output gap (x) to depend positively on entrepreneurship and wage gaps (m and
w),
x =   
1
k 1 
1
k 1wm
k
k 1 ; (12)
12
where entrepreneurship and wage gaps are governed by the trade condition:
w1+m
1
k 1 =  
1
k 1
1
k 1
"
mt0w
  +  
mt0 (w)
  + 1
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 
#
: (13)
That is , both wage and output gaps are functions of the entrepreneurship gap alone.
Now we turn to labor variables which are all time invariant along the BGP. Using
(8), one obtains an entrepreneur-researcher trade-off relationship in the North: J1M
k
k 1
1 +
J2R
k
k 1 =  
1
k 1N
k
k 1
1 , or,
M1(R) =
0@ 1k 1N kk 11   J2R kk 1
J1
1A k 1k ; (14)
where J1  1 
 
k
k 1
  1
k 1 +
 
k
k 1
  k
k 1 and J2 
 
k
k 1
  k
k 1

 
1  
 1
k 1
are constants, mea-
suring the effective shares of entrepreneurial and research activities, respectively. Even
though there are two types of individuals in the North, there exists a labor-market link
that establishes the negative relation between entrepreneurship M1 and GPT R&D effort
R. An increases in M1 or R reduces labor supply for production, but an increase in M1
increases the labor demand. When M1 increases, labor demand increases and the labor
supply from the entrepreneurial type decreases, and these imply that the short-fall in
labor supply needs to be made up by the research type and so R decreases.
We can also manipulate (9) and (3) to derive the revenue-wage ratio in the South,
X2
w2
=
1 + 

N2
"
1 

k
k   1
N2
M2
  k
k 1
#
(15)
as well as the entrepreneurial activities in the South,
M2 =
"

1  

k
k   1
  1
k 1
+

k
k   1
  k
k 1
# 1 k
k
N2 = J
1 k
k
1 N2; (16)
which are both constant due to the absence of the entrepreneur-researcher trade-off. As
a result, the entrepreneurship gap is a function of North R&D activities alone, governed
by the following negative relationship: m(R) = M1(R)
M2
=

 
1
k 1N
k
k 1
1   J2R
k
k 1
 k 1
k
/N2 ,
implying that both wage and output gaps are also functions ofR: w = w(R) and x = x(R).
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Finally, along the BGP and with (15) and (16), (7) can be written as:
 (X1 +X2) (1 + g)
(1 + )w1
=
kN2
k + (1  ) (k   1)
(1 + x) (1 + g)
w
=

k   1
k
R
NR1
 1
k 1 r +  (R)
0 (R)
,
(17)
where the left-hand side, (X1+X2)(1+g)
(1+)w1
= kN2
k+(1 )(k 1)
(1+x)(1+g)
w
, is the R&D multiplier on
the BGP, and the the right-hand side is strictly increasing in R. As x, g, and w are all
functions of R, the second equality in (17) demonstrates this is the equation by which the
equilibrium R is determined. We further use (15), together with (14), and (16), to derive,
aside from a constant,
 (X1 +X2) (1 + g)
(1 + )w1
/
(
N1
"
1 

1
1   
 1
k 1

k   1
k
R
N1
 k
k 1
#
+
N2
w(R)
)
(1 + g(R)) :
(18)
Combining this with (17), one can see that had one ignored the effects via w(R) and g(R),
a unique level of R&D activity would have been pinned down immediately. Yet, to as-
sess the effect of trade liberalization, the general equilibrium object wage gap w and the
growth rate g are both crucial, thereby requiring more thorough analysis with which we
now proceed.
3.2 Trade and Sustained Growth
Before establishing the measures of welfare gains from trade, we must explain the mech-
anism under which trade costs may affect long-run growth. From (18), observe that the
R&D multiplier consists of three effects of GPT R&D effort: (i) a labor-reallocation effect
as a result of occupational choice via the term in the square bracket, (ii) a growth effect
via g(R) reflecting the fact that global aggregate revenue grows with the GPT innovation,
and (iii) a general equilibrium wage-gap effect via w(R). In general, how the multiplier
changes in R is ambiguous.
Note that for a given R, a reduction in  only affects the multiplier via the wage gap
w, and the right-hand side of (17) is unaffected. Under the North-South structure, t0 =
t10=t20 > 1, we generally expect that the wage gap w > 1.11 Trade liberalization tends
to reduce this gap, as it makes the global economy more integrated and spurs the labor
11In addition to t0 > 1, the differences in model primitives between the two countries include relative
population size  and the fact that GPT innovation occurs only in the North, the latter of which should also
contribute to w > 1. Thus, the only possibility for w > 1 not to hold is a very large . In our calibrated
model,  = 2:3948, which reflects that “North” countries having larger human capital. But this is not
large enough to generate w  1 in our calibrated model, which entails w = 1:38 under benchmark  and
w = 28:38 in the autarkic world. See Sections 4.1 and 4.4 and Appendix C for details.
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demand in the South relative to that in the North. Thus, trade liberalization tends to
increases the R&D multiplier for a given R. Because the right-hand side of (17) strictly
increases inR, trade liberalization therefore would induce an increase in equilibriumR as
long as the multiplier decreases in R or does not increase in R faster than the right-hand
side of (17) around the initial equilibrium R. This is Cases (a) and (b) in Figure 1. But is it
possible that the multiplier increases in R faster than the right-hand side as illustrated by
Case (c) in Figure 1? This is implausible because it can be ruled out by checking whether
equilibrium R would increase when there is a transitory positive shock to the arrival
rate, written as ~ = 0 (R) with 0 > 1 during period  and 0 = 1 from  + 1 onward.
For any given R , such a shock implies that the left-hand side of (17) increases because
w (R) is unaffected and g (R) increases temporarily for period , and that the right-hand
side decreases because the rate of creative destruction  (R+1) is unaffected but 0 (R)
increases. Thus, equilibrium R must decrease in Case (c), but this is implausible. That is,
Case (c) can be ruled out by Samuelson’s Correspondence Principle.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
The key intuition here is that aggregate world revenue and hence aggregate labor demand in
unit of the North’s labor (X1+1 +X2+1) =w1 increase in face of trade liberalization because
a more integrated economy implies a stronger demand for the South’s labor (relative to
the North’s) which reduces the wage gap (essentially a factor-price-equalization effect of
trade). When R increases as a result, the growth rate g becomes higher, which further
implies faster growth in (X1+1 +X2+1) =w1 and so the higher growth rate is sustained.
Namely, trade amplifies the spiral effect of growth.
3.3 Welfare Gains from Trade
In this subsection, we first derive welfare formula for a given country, and then compare
with the static version of the model to investigate how dynamics matter. We also derive
formula for the welfare gap between the North and South.
Under the BGP, the welfare can be measured byUn =
R1
0
Cn0e
gte tdt =
R1
0
Cn0e
 [ (R) ln()]tdt.
To ensure finite lifetime utility, we impose a modified Brock-Gale condition in a fashion
similar to that in Bond, Wang and Yip (1996):  > maxR  (R) ln (). This condition will
be met if the maximal arrival rate is not too high and the step size of the ladder, , not too
large, which will be checked in our quantitative analysis.
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In country n, the life time utility on a balanced growth path starting from t = 0 is
Un =
Z 1
0
Qn0e
 [ (R) ln()]tdt =
Yn0=Nn
Pn0
Z 1
0
e [ (R) ln()]tdt
=
1
  g
Yn0
Nn
1
Pn0
=
1
   (R) ln ()
Yn0
Nn
1
Pn0
(19)
We first focus on the North. In Appendix B, we show that
U 01
U1
=
  g
  g0 
Y 010=N
0
1
Y10=N1
 P10
P 010
=
   (R) ln ()
   (R0) ln ()| {z }
GR

 
x0 + 
1+

w0 1 
x+ 
1+

w 1| {z }
IG

 
T10
T20
+ ( 
w
) 
T10
T20
+ ( 
0
w0 )
 
!  1

| {z }
ACR
(20)
where the terms in the last line is defined by each multiplicative term in the previous
line. The first term that operates solely through the change in growth rate, and is hence
called the growth-rate effect (GR). If the relative wage (w) and output scale (x) are held
fixed in face of a trade shock, GR is the only dynamic channel affecting welfare. The sec-
ond term is derived from the relative change in per capita nominal income Y10=N1. In the
ACR framework where balanced trade is imposed, this term does not usually appear. It
appears here because trade is not balanced due to the royalty payments from the South
to the North. This term is therefore called income gains effect (IG). The price-index effect
is named ACR because it equals exactly the ACR formula (011=11)
  1
 , as shown in Ap-
pendix B. As the BEJK model is within the ACR framework, it is not surprising that this
term appears in the formula. Needless to say, a general equilibrium objects w and x are
intertwined with GPT R&D effort R, and hence there may be dynamic gains from trade
that operate through these general equilibrium effects and affecting both the IG and ACR
terms.
In our quantitative analysis, we are interested in the above decomposition, and the
results will be examined in a convenient way by rewriting (20):
1 =
ln GR
ln (Total Gains)
+
ln IG
ln (Total Gains)
+
ln ACR
ln (Total Gains)
, (21)
As just mentioned, theGR effect does not reflect the true dynamic gains from trade. To
account for the true dynamic gains from trade, we compare our model with a purely static
version of the model in which  = 0. Obviously, both the equilibrium R and growth rate
are zero under such a parameter constraint. From (14) and (16), it is immediate that all
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entrepreneurship variables become constant (which is a also feature in the BEJK model).
The fact that growth rate g = 0 in the static model implies that the GR effect disappears.
To isolate the contribution of dynamics on the total gains from trade (called dynamic
gains from trade), one could write:
U 01
U1
=
U 01
U1
U 01
U1

static
 U
0
1
U1

static
= GR IGACR
IGjstatic  ACRjstatic
  IGjstatic  ACRjstatic ; (22)
where the sub-label of static indicates the corresponding value under the static model.
The true dynamic gains are thus the first two multiplicative terms, which reflect the GR
effect in the dynamic model and the general equilibrium effects of trade on the IG and
ACR components that are not captured by the static model.
Equivalently, we can write (22) as
ln

GR IGACRIGjstaticACRjstatic

ln

U 01
U1
 = 1  ln  IGjstatic  ACRjstatic
ln

U 01
U1
 ; (23)
and one can simply compute the share of the dynamic gains (which we sometimes call
dynamic share in short) by calculating the right-hand side of the above equation after com-
puting the gains from trade in the static model.
Next, we consider the South’s welfare by considering the welfare gap between the two
countries u  U1=U2, which, as shown in Appendix B, is given by,
u  U1
U2
=  1
1 + 
1 +    

x+

1 + 
 T10
T20
(w)  + 1
T10
T20
w  +  
!  1

; (24)
That is, under common growth, the welfare gap is simply a combination of income and
price gaps.
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Calibration
In our quantitative implementation, we specify the arrival rate as:  (R) = R, with
 > 0,  2 (0; 1), a form commonly used in the innovation and growth literature. We
calibrate our model economy to match the world economy. An important task in the
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calibration is to reasonably define the North and South countries. Our approach is to take
the Penn World Tables (PWT9.0) data and select those countries with at least two-thirds of
the U.S. real GDP per worker as the North.12 The countries under consideration are based
on availability in other datasets including the World Development Indicators (WDI) and
the Global Report of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which help calibrating the
number of entrepreneurs, using Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) in the GEM
Global Report together with the WDI.13
The key targets to match are (i) the long-run economic growth rate, (ii) the North-
South ratios of TFPs and manufacturing outputs, and (iii) the shares of entrepreneurs and
researchers in the North. While the full calibration procedure is relegated to Appendix C,
we summarize the results in Table 1 here.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
4.2 Welfare Gains from Trade
As a common practice, we measure welfare gains from trade based on one of the follow-
ing two scenarios: (i) compared with autarky:  = 2 (benchmark) compared to  ! 1
(autarky); (ii) compared with free trade:  = 1 (free trade) compared to  = 2 (bench-
mark). We first show the results of total gains from trade, and decompose them into the
GR, IG, and the ACR effects. Then, we conduct three counter-factuals. As mentioned in
Section 3, the GR effect in the simple decomposition is not necessarily the dynamic com-
ponent of the total gains, if the general equilibrium effects are non-negligible. Thus, we
compare with the static model in which  = 0 (zero arrival rate) to find the “true” dy-
namic share of the gains from trade. The second counter-factual is to investigate the role
of skill distribution by shutting this down. In particular, we compare with the model in
which labor is homogeneous, and so researchers, entrepreneurs, and production workers
are of the same type of labor. The third counter-factual is to investigate the role of occu-
pational choice by comparing with a model in which entrepreneurial activities are fixed
at their equilibrium values.
12The GDP measure used is output at constant PPP in 2011 million US$ (rgdpo). All data are averaged
over 2000-2014.
13Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity is the fraction of surveyed individuals (18-64 years old) who are
involved in a nascent firm or new firm or both (if doing both, still counted as one active person).
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4.2.1 Simple decomposition
We first conduct a simple decomposition by the three factors in (21) to understand the sep-
arate effects through growth rate, income gains, and price index (i.e., the ACR statistics).
The results are summarized in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
To begin, we examine gains from trade as compared with autarky. The growth rate im-
proves from 1:8511% to 1:8977%, increasing by 0:047 percentage points. The growth-rate
effect, income-gains effect, and the ACR statistic are 1:0422, 1:0063, and 1:0044, respec-
tively.
In a model with balanced trade and single input (which are typical assumptions in the
trade literature), the nominal income effect does not exist (by choosing numeraire). But
in this model where trade is imbalanced due to royalty payment, the North benefits from
trade through this monopoly rent, thereby yielding a positive income gain. Interestingly,
this IG effect is even larger than the ACR statistics when comparing with autarky. With
positive income gains and the large share of the growth-rate effect via GR, our results
indicate that the ACR statistic understates total gains from trade by a large margin.
Also note that the ACR effect is much larger in the second scenario than the first. The
intuition is that by Shephard’s Lemma, the ACR statistic reflects essentially a direct effect
of trade costs on prices, which operates mostly through the imported goods. Compared
with the first scenario, trade costs are lower in the second one, and thus demand for
imported goods tend to be larger, thus amplifying the direct price effect. In addition, the
South’s wages also amplifies the direct effect of trade cost on prices because they reflect
the marginal costs in the South. Again, trade costs are lower in the second scenario, in
which case the South’s wages tend to be closer to the North’s, which amplifies the direct
price effect and results in a larger ACR statistic.
To understand why the GR effect is larger in the first scenario, recall from (17) and (18)
that for a given R, the right-hand side of (17) is fixed, whereas the left-hand side changes
in relative wage w. Under a larger trade cost, w is quite large (as can be seen in Section
4.4 below); moving from autarky to the benchmark trade costs thus reduces w drastically
and results in a larger increase in R compared with the second scenario. In other words,
when trade barriers are high, there are less incentives to conduct GPT innovation because
the scope of its application is smaller due to an overall smaller market size in the North’s
viewpoint. This illustrates why reducing trade barriers all the way from autarky would
help promoting R&D activity strongly.
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4.2.2 Comparison with the static model
As mentioned, the simple decomposition exercises above do not reflect the true dynamic
gains from trade because the GPT innovation also affects wage and hence output gaps
that affect the IG and the ACR measures. To rectify this problem, we obtain pure static
gains via a counterfactual exercise by shutting down the sole growth driver from GPT
innovation. Specifically, this is by setting  = 0 (and hence R = 0 in equilibrium), under
which not only GR = 1 by construction, but IG and ACR are also adjusted to exclude
the R&D effect – so these two components are generally different from those reported in
Table 2. By subtracting pure static gains from the total gains, we obtain the true dynamic
gains from trade and the dynamic share can then be calculated by (23). The results are
summarized in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
The gains from trade in the counterfactual static model under the two scenarios are
1:146% and 1:620% , respectively. These numbers are to be compared with the gains in the
dynamic model, 5:336% and 3:184%, as reported above. Hence, the gains in the dynamic
model are 4:66 times larger than the gains in static model in the first scenario and 1:97
times larger in the second. The dynamic shares in the two scenarios are 78:1% and 48:7%,
respectively. It turns out the dynamic shares are rather similar to the growth-rate effects in
Table 2, suggesting that the general equilibrium effect of GPT innovation on gains from
trade via wage and output gaps are modest. The intuitions behind why the dynamic
(static) share is larger (smaller) in the first scenario compared with the second are the
same as those explained in Section 4.2.1 for why the GR (ACR) effect is larger (smaller) in
the first scenario.
4.2.3 Entrepreneurial occupational choice
We now consider a counterfactual in which entrepreneurial occupational choice is elimi-
nated. We do so by fixing M1, M2, and m at their benchmark values. Under this given set
of equilibrium values M1, M2, and m, we use (13) to solve for w, use (12) to solve for x,
and then use (17) to solve for R. The welfare results are summarized in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
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Here, we see only very slight changes compared with Table 3. To understand this,
observe that the multiplier in the absence of occupational choice can be written as
 (X1 +X2) (1 + g)
(1 + )w1
/

( N1)
  1
k 1
1 M
k
k 1
1 +N
  1
k 1
2 M
k
k 1
2 =w(R)

(1 + g(R)) . (25)
Following a similar analysis in Section 3.2 and for a given R, when trade liberalization
reduces wage gap, the multiplier also increases. Thus, qualitatively trade still promotes
growth and dynamic gains in the same way as the benchmark model. However, quanti-
tatively, shutting down entrepreneurial occupational choice turns out to have only neg-
ligible effects. Comparing (18) and (25) shows that the difference lies in how much an
increase in GPT R&D R reduces the entrepreneurial activities in the North. We find that
M1 at  = 1; 2; 1 are 0:97494, 0:974661, and 0:974541, respectively, only slightly lowered
despite a large reduction of trade cost from autarky to free trade. This suggests that the
positive effect of trade liberalization on entrepreneurship is essentially offset by the neg-
ative effect of labor reallocation that discourages entrepreneurship.
The above finding also helps explain why we have always obtained a positive income
gains effect along the BGP. Observe from (3) that the sales-wage ratio Xi=wi is propor-
tional to (Mi)
k
k 1 . Also observe that the North’s income in unit of North labor can be
written as
Y1
w1
=
1 +    
1 + 
X1
w1
+
 (X1 +X2) (1 + g)
(1 + )w1
.
That is, it can be decomposed into the R&D multiplier and a term that is proportional to
the sales-wage ratio. Trade liberalization induces only a small fall in M1 and hence in the
sales-wage ratio, but generates a sizable amplifying multiplier effect, thus leading to a
positive income gains effect.
4.2.4 Homogeneous labor
One may further inquire what if we completely remove labor heterogeneity. As shown
in Appendix D, the model mechanism of trade and growth as described in Section 3.2 is
generally preserved if we instead assume homogeneous labor so that the resource con-
straint becomes Ri + Mi + Li = Ni, where Ri, Mi, and Li are the number of researchers,
entrepreneurs, and production workers, respectively. Removing the skill distribution and
making these three occupations perfect substitutes simplify the model greatly. To high-
light the role of heterogeneous labor, the counterfactual analyses are conducted under the
same parameters. The results of gains from trade are summarized in Table 5.
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[Insert Table 5 here.]
Compare with the benchmark model, both the total gains and the dynamic share in the
homogeneous model are around 25% and 10% lower, respectively. Consistent with these
results, GR falls and the ACR effect increases in both scenarios. The IG effects are similar
to the benchmark case. These results are intuitive. The GPT R&D labor is quite small
fraction of the population; in the presence of a fat-tailed skill distribution, the marginal
researcher is still quite talented. Lower trade barriers incentivize the GPT innovators to
tap on these talented people more and exert more intertemporal spillovers.
4.3 Comparative Statics
One may now inquire how the total gains from trade and dynamic share change when
some key parameters change. In particular, we are interested in the comparative statics
with respect to: (i) a fatter tail of the productivity distribution (a lower ), (ii) a fatter tail
of the distribution of worker skill (a lower k), (iii) an improvement in the efficacy of R&D
(a higher ), (iv) a larger bargaining power of the GPT firm (a higher ), and (v) a higher
initial relative knowledge stock in the North (a higher t0). For these investigations, we
focus on scenario (i), i.e., comparing with autarky. The results are shown in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
A smaller  implies larger productivity dispersion among firms as well as higher av-
erage productivity. Larger productivity dispersion means larger scope of comparative
advantage and higher productivity increases the stake of trade. Thus, it is not surprising
to find that the total gains from trade increases. Moreover, a smaller  implies that the
share of profit in aggregate sales, 1= (1 + ), becomes larger, and this increases the R&D
multiplier, and hence R and the growth rate as well. This dynamic effect adds further to
the total gains from trade. However, the dynamic share actually decreases, implying the
former two effects dominate the dynamic effect.
A smaller k implies larger skill dispersion and better top researchers. This is obviously
conducive to the GPT innovation and leads to higher growth rate. The increase in innova-
tion effort R induced by trade liberalization can be larger with a smaller k, and this leads
to larger dynamic share of total gains. The total gains from trade increases because of a
larger dynamic component and an overall more capable population.
A higher  implies a higher arrival rate of GPT innovation for a given R, and this in-
centivizes the GPT R&D despite a creative destruction effect, which is a standard outcome
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in quality ladders models. It is also intuitive that this increases both the total gains from
trade and the dynamic share. A larger  also encourages the GPT R&D and increases
the total gains from trade. However, the dynamic share decreases because of a stronger
income-gains (IG) effect.
From (17) and (18), we see that t0 affects only the right-hand side of (17) directly via
the wage gap w in (18). A higher t0 implies a larger wage gap w and hence a smaller
R&D multiplier, resulting a lower growth rate. With a higher t0, the production activities
are more concentrated in the North, and hence the gains from reducing the trade barrier
becomes smaller. However, as a higher t0 makes the North-South structure more uneven
in a static sense, the dynamic channel of gains from trade highlighted by (17) and (18)
becomes more important.
4.4 North-South Welfare Gap
This subsection investigates the welfare gap between the North and South countries, i.e.,
u = U1=U2 =
Y1=N1
Y2=N2
P2
P1
 y1
y2
P2
P1
 y=

P1
P2

, using the formula derived in (24). The results of
the welfare gap u and the two sub-components – the (per capita) nominal income gap y
and the price gap (P1=P2) are shown in Table 7. To further understand the changes here,
we also report the corresponding wage gap w.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
Table 7 shows that trade liberalization reduces the North-South welfare (or real in-
come) gap, and the reduction is especially sharp from benchmark  = 2 to free trade. This
may seem a little counter-intuitive because one may tend to think that the effect of trade
opening from autarky is stronger. This is, indeed, the case for nominal income gap (y),
and changes in y follows closely changes in w. However, the large reduction in nominal
income gap or wage gap is largely offset by the large reduction in the price gap, thereby
resulting in small changes in the welfare or real income gap.
The price gap in the autarkic world (taking  !1) is given by P1
P2
=

t0w + 
t0(w)
 +1
  1
 !
t
  1

0 w, which consists of two components: (i) the technology advantage in the North (the
calibrated value of t 
1

0  0:53 suggests the price gap is close to one-half); (ii) the wage
gap that reflects the higher marginal cost of production in the North (the value of w in
autarky at the calibrated model is 28:38, which suggests a much larger price gap even
with technology gap accounted). When the economy moves from the autarkic world to
the benchmark economy, there is a strong general equilibrium effect such that the wage
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gap reduces sharply. Due to this large drop in the wage gap, the technology gap becomes
the dominant force in the benchmark economy (with  = 2), thus resulting in a price gap
P1=P2 < 1, which, in turn, helps maintain the high welfare gap under the benchmark. As
an economy moves toward free trade, the effect of the technology gap on prices vanishes,
subsequently leading to the law of one price with P1=P2 = 1. This, accompanied with also
reduced wage and nominal income gaps, then yields essentially a negligible welfare gap
in a frictionless world.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now perform sensitivity analysis. In particular, we check our findings when we alter
each of the following four preset parameters one-by-one: (i) set  = 2:74 as in Simonovska
and Waugh (2014) or  = 4:12 as in Head and Mayer (2014), (ii) set k = 1:515 as in Gabaix,
Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016) and k = 1:667 as in Jones (2015), (iii) set  = 0:8 (more
potential researchers) or  = 0:9 (fewer potential researchers), and (iv) set  = 1:5 (lower
trade costs) or  = 2:5 (higher trade costs). In each case, we recalibrate the model economy
and then recompute the welfare gains and the counter-factual static gains.14 The results
are summarized in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
First of all, we find tail indices of firm productivity () and worker skill (k) essential
for the importance of the total gains from trade and dynamic share. As the productiv-
ity distribution becomes more dispersed ( changes from its benchmark value of 4 to
2:75), i.e., trade elasticity [in absolute value] becomes smaller), the total gains from trade
slightly decrease from the benchmark of 5:34% to 5:11% when comparing with autarky,
and the dynamic share reduces sharply from 78:1% to 16:5%. In fact, a smaller  implies
more productivity dispersion among firms, and this implies that static gains from trade
in the sense of comparative advantage is more important, explaining the smaller share of
dynamic gains. The results are the opposite when  increases to 4:12.
When the skill distribution becomes fatter (k lowers to 1:515), the total gains when
comparing with autarky is about 8:14%, and the dynamic share about 89:4%; both are
substantially larger than the benchmark case. The increase in R induced by trade liber-
alization can be much larger if the underlying skill distribution has a fatter tail, and this
14Note that the directions of changes of total gains from trade and dynamic shares might not be exactly
the same as those comparative statics reported in Table 6 since the exercises here are based on re-calibrated
models.
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explains the larger gains when k is smaller. The results are the opposite when k increases
to 1:667. An interesting contrast here is that the dynamic share becomes smaller when the
tail of the productivity distribution becomes fatter, whereas it becomes larger when the
tail of the skill distribution becomes fatter. Taken together, the welfare results are quite
sensitive to how fat-tailed the productivity and skill distributions are.
The welfare results are clearly insensitive to varying  , the population share of the en-
trepreneurial type. This is consistent with the observation in Section 4.2.3 that the effects
of entrepreneurial occupational choice are quite small. Finally, as we pick benchmark
value of  = 2 in the ballpark of empirically estimated bilateral trade costs, (1:5; 2:5) cov-
ers a large ground of this ballpark. The first takeaway is that the total gains from trade
and dynamic share are somewhat sensitive to the choice of  to represent the current econ-
omy, much less so than the above-mentioned tail indices but more so than  . Second, the
larger (smaller) gains from autarky to  = 1:5 (2:5) than the benchmark value are straight-
forward results of “gains from trade”. Third, that the dynamic share for  = 1:5 (2:5) is
smaller (larger) than the benchmark case can be understood with the reasoning for the
difference between the two scenarios in Tables 2 and 3. Namely, when trade liberalizes
from autarky to some  , the larger (smaller) the  , the more the GR (ACR) effect operates
as explained in Section 4.2.1.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of international trade and endogenous
growth via innovation. There are two types of innovation with the first being the upgrad-
ing of general purpose technology and the second being the entrepreneurial activities that
develop differentiated products. We highlight the channel through which trade liberaliza-
tion increases the GPT R&D and hence the long run economic growth. It is fundamentally
a market-size effect as an R&D multiplier.
The welfare formula is a product of a growth-rate effect, an income-gains effect, and
the ACR statistic. When compared with autarky (scenario [i]), the total gains from trade
are 5:34%, and dynamics accounts for 78% of the gains. Whereas the total gains from trade
are not particularly large compared with other studies on dynamic gains from trade, the
dynamic share found in this model is higher than most other studies except Perla et al.
(2019). We also find that the dynamic share is well approximated by the growth-rate
effect, suggesting that shutting down dynamics does not entail large general equilibrium
effects on wages and revenues. When trade is liberalized from a benchmark trade cost
to frictionless trade (scenario [ii]), the dynamic share becomes smaller at 48:7%, while the
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ACR share becomes much larger at 41:9% in the simple decomposition. The contrast with
scenario (i) indicates that the dynamic effects are stronger when trade costs are larger, and
the ACR effect stronger when trade costs are smaller. The reasonings are clearly explained
in Section 4.2.1.
In the counter-factual in which labor is homogenous, the total gains from trade and
dynamic falls about 25% and 10%, respectively, highlighting the importance of taking
worker heterogeneity into account. In the comparative statics, we find that fatter tails
of firm-productivity and worker-skill distribution increase the total gains from trade, but
there is an interesting contrast that a fatter tail of skill (productivity) distribution leads to
a larger (smaller) dynamic share. We also find that the welfare results are quite sensitive
to these tail indices quantitatively. We have also found large effects of trade liberalization
on narrowing down the North-South welfare gap.
In so far, we have not discussed whether gains from trade would possibly be larger
or smaller if we take into account the dynamics along the transition path. This is because
to do so under a generalized AH framework is not obvious because of the complication
associated with converting from innovation time to calendar time. Basically, one must
compute each innovation intervals one by one and integrate all interval over the calendar
time. Nonetheless, in the continuous-time stochastic model of Perla et al. (2019), it is
found that the extra gains along the transition path only account for 9% of the long run
gains.
It is clear that GPT innovation in our model can be combined with other types of trade
models with imperfect competition in which the profits/rents of firms can be shared with
the GPT firms in a similar fashion. Hence, our model can be generalized to incorporate
process or product innovation or other forms of technology diffusion, as considered by
Perla et al. (2019), Sampson (2016), Impullitti and Licandro (2017), and Hsieh et al. (2019).
It is an interesting avenue of future research because it enables us to decompose dynamic
welfare and productivity gains from trade into various technology-related mechanisms.
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Figure 1: Effect of Trade Liberalization on R&D
RHS
LHS
LHS’
R* R*’
Case (a)
RHS
LHS
LHS’
R* R*’
Case (b)
RHS
LHS
LHS’
R*R*’
Case (c)
Parameter Value Meaning Notes
ρ 0.03 time preference rate
r 0.05 real interest rate
γ 1.014 GPT innovation ladder size
θ 4 Fréchet shape parameter of productivity draws
Simonovska and Waugh (2014a). Sensitivity 
analysis will be performed.
τ 2 trade cost
In the ballpark of estimated bilateral trade costs in 
the literature. Sensitivity analysis will be 
performed.
ψ 0.85 The fraction of the entrepreneurial type in the population
To reflect low R&D labor share in the population. 
Sensitivity analysis will be performed.
Parameter Value Meaning Target
k 2 Pareto shape parameter of the ability distribution
Share of income earned by top 1 percent income 
earners in the US, 0.1903
t₀ 12.719 Ratio of initial technology stockbetween the North and South
Ratio of TFP of the North countries to the South 
ones, 1.8885
β 0.1222 The bargaining power parameter ofthe GPT firm
χ 2.3948 Relative labor endowment
κ 2.510 Efficacy of GPT innovation
ε 0.2741 Curvature parameter of GPTinnovation
Table 1: Calibration
Panel A: Preset Parameters
Panel B: Calibrated Parameters
Notes: See Appendix C of the paper for the details of calibration.
These three parameter values are standard in the 
R&D-based endogenous growth literature.
These four parameters (β, χ, κ, and ε) are jointly 
calibrated from the share of entrepreneurs and and 
that of researchers in the North population, the 
manufacturing output ratio between the North and 
South, and the long-run economic growth rate.
GR effect IG effect ACR effect
0.047 5.336 1.042 1.006 1.004
  share (%) 79.6 12.0 8.4
0.017 3.184 1.016 1.003 1.013
  share (%) 49.7 8.4 41.9
Compared with Total gains fromtrade (% change)
Static gains from 
trade(% change)
Ratio of total to 
static gains
Dynamic share 
(%)
(i) Autarky 5.336 1.146 4.66 78.1
(ii) Free Trade 3.184 1.620 1.97 48.7
Change in growth 
rate (% points)
Gains from trade 
(% change)
Decomposition of Gains from Trade
Table 3: Comparison between Dynamic and Static Models
Table 2: Simple Decomposition of Total Gains from Trade 
(ii) Free Trade
(i) Autarky
Compared with
Compared with Total gains from trade (%)
Static gains from 
trade (%)
Ratio of total to 
static gains
Dynamic share 
(%)
(i) Autarky 5.420 1.147 4.72 78.8
(ii) Free Trade 3.219 1.624 1.98 49.6
Compared with Total gain from trade(%)
Static gains from 
trade (%) dynamic share (%) GR share (%) IG share (%) ACR share (%)
(i) Autarky 4.03 1.17 70.6 75.2 12.8 12.0
(ii) Free Trade 2.83 1.72 38.8 41.5 7.7 50.8
θ↓ k↓ κ↑ β↑ t₀↑
+ + + + -
+ + + + -
- + + - +
Table 7: North-South Welfare and Income Gaps
autarky benchmark free trade
1.93 1.86 1.01
29.02 1.42 1.01
15.03 0.76 1
28.38 1.38 0.98
Effect on
Welfare Gap (u)
Nominal Income Gap (y)
Table 5: Gains from Trade in the Model with Homogeneous Labor
Table 4: Dynamic vs Static Models in the Absence of Occupational Choice
Table 6: Comparative Statics
Growth rate
Price Gap (P₁/P₂)
Wage Gap (w)
Total gains from trade
Dynamic share
Compared with Total gains from trade (% change)
Static gains from 
trade(% change)
Ratio of total to static 
gains Dynamic share (%)
θ=2.74
(i) Autarky 5.111 4.252 1.20 16.5
(ii) Free Trade 3.309 2.953 1.12 10.6
θ=4.12
(i) Autarky 6.420 0.936 6.86 85.0
(ii) Free Trade 3.570 1.533 2.33 56.6
k=1.515
(i) Autarky 8.138 0.835 9.75 89.4
(ii) Free Trade 4.277 1.491 2.87 64.7
k=1.667
(i) Autarky 4.102 1.664 2.47 58.9
(ii) Free Trade 2.745 1.841 1.49 32.6
ψ=0.8
(i) Autarky 5.344 1.132 4.72 78.4
(ii) Free Trade 3.145 1.581 1.99 49.3
ψ=0.9
(i) Autarky 5.343 1.157 4.62 77.9
(ii) Free Trade 3.223 1.658 1.94 48.2
τ=1.5
(i) Autarky 5.920 1.697 3.49 70.7
(ii) Free Trade 2.120 0.986 2.15 53.2
τ=2.5
(i) Autarky 5.108 0.909 5.62 81.8
(ii) Free Trade 3.631 1.891 1.92 47.5
 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis
Appendix
In the appendix, we provide detailed mathematical derivations of the benchmark
model and the extensions, as well as detailed calibration strategies.
A Goods Markets
National income is given by
Y1 = (1  ) 1 + w1vL1 + 
1 + 
(X1 +X2) ,
Y2 = (1  ) 2 + w2vL2.
That is, there is an international redistribution of royalty payment from South to North
whenever  > 0. Market clearing condition for final goods is
Y1 = X1 +

1 + 
X2 = X11; +X12; ; (A.1)
Y2 = X2   
1 + 
X2 = X21; +X22; : (A.2)
Using X1 = X11; +X21; and X2 = X12; +X22; to combine with the above, we get
X12; = X21; +

1 + 
X2 (A.3)
The lack of balanced trade in final goods is because country 1’s royalty income from coun-
try 2 makes up its excessive net import.
Using BEJK Result 2 to rewrite (A.3),
12Y1 = 21Y2 +

1 + 
X2:
Using BEJK Result 1 in conjunction with (A.1) and (A.2), the above equality becomes
T2(w2)
 
1

X1 +

1 + 
X2

=
T1(w1)
 
2

X2   
1 + 
X2

+

1 + 
X2, (A.4)
where 1 = T1w 1v + T2 (w2v)
  and 2 = T1 (w1v)
  + T2w 2v .
A few algebraic manipulation of (A.4) gives the ratio of total revenues proportional to
i
the ratio of entrepreneurship in skill units:
X1
X2
=

1
2
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 

M1
M2
w  ;
where w  w1=w2 measures the wage gap. With Ti = Mivti0 and letting t0 = t10t20 and
m =
M1
M2
, the above becomes
X1
X2
= mw
 

"
mt0w
 
v + 
 
mt0 (wv)
  + 1
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 
#
:
B Welfare Gains from Trade
In country n, the life time utility on a balanced growth path starting from t = 0 is
Un =
Z 1
0
Qn0e
 [ (R) ln()]tdt =
Yn0=Nn
Pn0
Z 1
0
e [ (R) ln()]tdt
=
1
  g
Yn0
Nn
1
Pn0
=
1
   (R) ln ()
Yn0
Nn
1
Pn0
We first focus on the North. Using (A.1) and (15), one can rewrite Y10=N1 as
Y10
N1
=  1

x+

1 + 

X20
N2
=  1

x+

1 + 

1 + 

w20
"
1 

k
k   1
N2
M2
  k
k 1
#
(B.5)
Recall from (16) that M2 is a constant. Using BEJK Result 3 and (19), the relative change
in welfare due to a trade shock can be written as
U 01
U1
=
   (R) ln ()
   (R0) ln ()
Y 010
N 01
Y10
N1
0@ T10T20 + ( w20w10 ) 
T10
T20
w0 10
w 10
+ ( 0w
0
20
w10
) 
1A  1 :
Using (B.5) and choosing period 0’s labor in country 1 as numeraire, i.e., w10 = w010 = 1,
the above becomes
ii
U 01
U1
=
   (R) ln ()
   (R0) ln () 
 
x0 + 
1+

w0 1 
x+ 
1+

w 1

 
T10
T20
+ ( 
w
) 
T10
T20
+ ( 
0
w0 )
 
!  1

 GR IG ACR;
where the last line is defined by the each multiplicative term respectively. Namely, the
relative change in welfare in response to a trade shock can be decomposed into a growth-
rate effect (GR), an income gains effect (IG), and a price-index effect (ACR). Note that the
third term above is exactly the same as the ACR statistic and is henceforth denoted. To
see this, observe that with w1 = 1, the domestic consumption share is
11 =
T10
T10 + T20(

w
) 
;
and it is readily verified that the ACR formula (011=11)
  1
 is exactly the same as the third
term.
For the welfare gap between the two countries u  U1=U2, first note that the growth-
rate effect is the same for both the North and South, and hence it will not show up in the
gap, and thus
u = U1=U2 =
Y1=N1
Y2=N2
P2
P1
.
From (A.1) and (A.2), we can derive the per capita (nominal) income as:
Y2
N2
=
1 +    
1 + 
X2
N2
;
Y1
N1
=  1

x+

1 + 

X2
N2
Using the above and BEJK Result 3,
u  U1
U2
=
Y10
N1
Y20
N2
P20
P10
=  1
1 + 
1 +    

x+

1 + 
 T10
T20
(w)  + 1
T10
T20
w  +  
!  1

:
which is a combination of income and price gaps.
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C Calibration
We calibrate our model economy to match the world economy. An important task in the
calibration is to reasonably define the North and South countries. Our approach is to
take the Penn World Tables (PWT) 9.0 data and select those countries with at least 67%
of the US real GDP per employment (person) as the North.15 Then, we take the inter-
section with the countries in other data sets that are needed for our calibration purpose.
Other data sets needed are World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Global Report
of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). As we proxy the number of entrepreneurs by
combining the values of Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA)16 in the GEM Global
Report and the WDI, for each country we take the average during 2000-2014 due to the
data availability of the GEM report.
Following the R&D-based endogenous growth literature, we set the time preference
rate at  = 3%, the real interest rate at r = 5% and GPT innovation ladder size at    1 =
1:4%. Following recent trade literature, we take the Fréchet shape parameter (connected
to the trade elasticity in the gravity regression) as  = 4 (Simonovska and Waugh 2014a;
sensitivity analysis will be performed). The trade cost parameter is set as  = 2. This is in
the ballpark of most estimated bilateral trade costs in the literature, but it is slightly higher
to reflect that the trade costs between the North and South countries are higher than those
among North countries. We will thus conduct sensitivity analysis where  = 1:5 and  =
2:5. Observing much lower R&D labor share, we choose the share of the entrepreneurial
type labor to be  = 85% and hence the share of the research type 1    = 15%; again,
sensitivity analysis will be conducted on this. In a unit-free environment, we normalize
N1 = 1 and initial values w10 = 1.
Other parameters will be calibrated based on available data moments. We use World
Inequality Database (https://wid.world/) to calibrate k. Under the Pareto assumption,
top p percents income earners earn a total share of s = (100=p)
1
k
 1. To better reflect the
tail, we focus on top 1 percent income earners. Using the share of income earned by top 1
percent income earners in the US and averaging across years during 2000-2014, this share
equals to 0:1903. This implies k = 1:563, which is taken as our benchmark value of k. We
will also perform sensitivity analysis on this parameter.
To compute t0  T10T20 , we utilize the fact that the ratio of the mean productivity between
15The exact GDP measure we use is output side real GDP at constant PPPs (in mil. 2011 US$; RGDPO).
Every measure/variable we use in the calibration is the average during 2000-2014 except for our calibration
of the long-run growth rate.
16Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity is the fraction of surveyed individuals (18-64 years old) who are
involved in a nascent firm or new firm or both (if doing both, still counted as one active person).
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the two countries under Frechét distributions is given by
E1 (z)
E2 (z)
=
T
1

10
T
1

20
= t
1

0 .
We proxy E1 (z) =E2 (z) by the relative total factor productivity (TFP), which is obtained
from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0.17 We obtain E1 (z) =E2 (z) = 1:8885, and thus
t0 = 12:719.
From WDI, the manufactured output ratio by x = X1=X2 = 3:285. Since the GPT inno-
vation is conducted in North, the balanced growth rate is computed based on the average
growth rate of North countries under the definition above: g = 1:8977%. Turning now to
the components of labor, we denote nRi  NR as the number (rather than effective units)
researchers and nMi as the number of entrepreneurs in country i. It is readily verified that
nM1 = N
M
1

1 G  aM1  = k   1k
 k
k 1
  
1
k 1N
  1
k 1
1 M
k
k 1
1v (C.6)
nM2 = N2

1 G  aM2  = k   1k
 k
k 1
N
 1
k 1
2 M
k
k 1
2 (C.7)
nR = NR1

1 G  aR1  = k   1k
 k
k 1
(1   )  1k 1 N 
1
k 1
1 R
k
k 1 : (C.8)
We have reservation about the quality of data of entrepreneur counts in the South (due
to large fractions of self-employed who tend to report yes for TEA in the survey) and
hence will use only data from North countries. Specifically, we use weighted average TEA
(average across countries with the weight being total employment) in the GEM global
report to proxy nM1 =N1. We further use “Researchers in R&D (per million people)” in WDI
to calculate nR=N1. These shares are: nM1 =N1 = 0:0730 and nR=N1 = 0:00357. Thus, the
researcher-entrepreneur ratio turn out to be approximately 1:20 ( n
R=N1
nM1 =N1
= 0:00357
0:0730
= 0:0489).
Combining (14), (16), (C.6), (C.7), and (C.8), one can show that n
M
2
N2
=
nM1 =N1
1 nR=N1 . Thus, we
17For the construction of TFPs in Penn World Table, see Feesntra, Inklaar, Timmer (2015). Specifically, for
each North/South block, we proxy the TFP by the weighted average of each country’s TFP with the weight
being the manufacturing GDP. A special feature of the PWT data is that there are one measure of TFP for
cross-country comparison (CTFP), where the TFP level of the USA is set to 1 for all years, and another
by-country time-series measure (RTFPNA), where the TFP level is calculated relative to the country’s 2011
level (hence TFP of each country at 2011 is set to 1). As we need to take average value during 2000-2014, we
construct a panel of TFPs in the following way. We calculate a country c’s TFP at year t relative to the US’
level at 2011:
TFPc;t  CTFPc;t  RTFPNAUSA;t.
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compute: n
M
2
N2
=
nM1 =N1
1 nR=N1 = 0:07326. Furthermore, combining (16) and (C.7), we have
nM2
N2
= J 11
 
k 1
k
 k
k 1 ; with the definition of J1 given in Section 3.1,  can therefore be solved
out:
 = 1  k
k   1
nM2 =N2
1  nM2 =N2
= 0:1222;
which implies J1 = 0:80173.
We are left to compute four endogenous variables fR;M1;M2; wg and calibrate the
preference parameter , the technology parameter , and relative endowment parameter
. The seven equations needed are (12)-(17) in the solution algorithm (Section 3.1) plus
the law of motion g = R ln ().
Using (14), (16), and (C.8), we can conveniently write m = M1=M2 as
m =  
1
k

1  n
R
N1
 k 1
k
. (C.9)
From (12), we can write
 = x (k 1)  1wk 1mk, (C.10)
and thus (13) and (C.9) can be written as
w = x 1m
"
mt0w
  +  
mt0 (w)
  + 1
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 
#
m = xw 1 
1
k

1  n
R
N1
 1
k
.
Solving jointly the above two equations yields w = 1:3766 and m = 2:1555. Accordingly,
we can compute  = 2:3948 using (C.10), and M2 = J
1 k
k
1 
 1N1 = 0:4522, and M1 =
mJ
1 k
k
1 
 1N1 = 0:97466 from (14) and (16).
Using (C.6) and (C.8), we have
R
M1
=

1   
 
 1
k

nR=N1
nM1 =N1
 k 1
k
, (C.11)
and this allows us to compute R = 0:10834. Finally, with  = g= ln() = 1:3649, we use
(17) to calibrate
 =
1  

J1 (r + )w
 (1 + g) (x+ 1)
(1   )  1k 1

R
N1
 k
k 1
= 0:2741,
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and we use the growth law of motion to obtain
 =
g
R ln ()
= 2:510,
and this completes the calibration procedure.
D The Model with Homogenous Labor
The model before Section 2.4 is unchanged. So, we start with the labor market. Suppose
in contrast to benchmark model, labor is homogenous so that we have
R1 +M1 + L1 = N1, M2 + L2 = N2.
By BEJK Result 4 and the fact that part of the revenue is paid to the GPT firm, we have
vi =
1  
1 + 
Xi
Miv
, wi =

1 + 
Xi
Liv
.
In equilibrium wi = vi , and this implies that Miv = 1  Liv. In the South, this implies
that
L2 =

1   + N2, M2 =
1  
1   + N2: (D.12)
In the North, we have N1  R = M1v + L1 = 1 + L1 , or alternatively,
L1 =

1   +  (N1  R) (D.13)
M1 =
1  
1   +  (N1  R) (D.14)
The value of an innovation is still the same as V+1 =
(X1+1+X2+1)
(1+)(r+(R))
, but the problem
facing a GPT innovator becomes
max
R
 (R)V+1   w1R ;
where w1 replaces wR in the benchmark model. Whenever the innovation arrives, the in-
novator becomes the GPT monopoly. The first-order condition is therefore 0 (R)V+1 =
w1 , or
r + R
R 1
=

1 + 
X1+1 +X2+1
w1
: (D.15)
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Again, as explained in Section 3.2, the global sales of differentiated products denominated
in the North’s wages, (X1+1 +X2+1) =w1 , is still the key to determine equilibrium R.
Using (D.12) and (D.13), the labor market clearing conditions are

1 + 
X1 = w1L1 =

1   +  (N1  R)w1 ; (D.16)

1 + 
X2 = w2L2 =

1   + N2w2 . (D.17)
Taking the ratio of the above two equations entails
x = 

1  R
N1

w. (D.18)
Along the balanced growth path and using (D.16) and (D.17), we have
X1+1 +X2+1
w1
=
1 + 
1   + 

N1  R + N2
w

(1 + g) .
Combining the above with (D.15), we obtain
r + R
R 1 [1 + R ln ()]
=

1   + 

N1  R + N2
w

: (D.19)
The equations in Section 2.5 remain the same in this model. Combining (D.12) and (D.14)
entails
m = 

1  R
N1

; (D.20)
and from (D.18), we know that x = mw, which, when combined with (10), entails
w1+ =
mt0w
  +  
mt0 (w)
  + 1
1 +    
1 + 
+
 
1 + 
. (D.21)
So, a dynamic equilibrium on a balanced growth path can be obtained by solving fR;w;mg
jointly using (D.19), (D.20), and (D.21).
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